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1. PRINCIPLES 
 
 
 
European unemployment is too high, and employment is too low.  Over 7½ 
per cent of Europe’s workforce is unemployed, and only two thirds of people aged 15-
64 are in work. 
 
At the Lisbon summit two years ago the heads of government set the target 
that by 2010 the employment rate should rise from 64 per cent to at least 70 per cent.  
And for older workers between 55 and 64 the employment rate should rise from 38 
per cent to at least one half. 
 
These are ambitious targets.  They will require two big changes: more people 
must seek work, and among those seeking work a higher proportion must get a job.  
So we need higher participation, and (for full employment) we need a much lower 
unemployment rate. 
 
Can it be done?  A mere glance at the experience of different European 
countries shows that it can.  As Table 1 shows, four E.U. countries already exceed the 
overall target for 2010 (Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden).  And eight of 
the 15 countries in the E.U already have lower unemployment than the United States 
(the previous four plus Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal). 
 
So there is no such thing as “the European unemployment problem”.  The 
fundamental problem is high unemployment in four of the five large countries: 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain.  If high overall unemployment in Europe is to be 
reduced, these large countries will have to learn what they can from the experience of 
the rest of Europe.  At the same time no European country can be satisfied with its 
current performance.  In every country unemployment is higher than in the 1960s, and 
the participation rate (especially among older workers) is unsustainably low.  There 
will have to be improvement on both points if Europe’s employment target is to be 
met.  More people should look for work, and those who look should be helped to look 
more effectively. 
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Table 1 
Unemployment rates and employment/population ratios, 2001 (%) 
 
Employment/Population**  
Unemployment rate* 15-64 55-64 
Austria 4.0 68 27 
Belgium 6.8 60 25 
Denmark 4.2 76 57 
Finland 9.1 68 46 
France 9.2 62 37 
Germany 8.1 66 37 
Greece 7.3 56 38 
Ireland 4.4 65 47 
Italy 9.0 55 19 
Luxembourg 2.4 63 25 
Netherlands 2.6 74 39 
Portugal 4.4 69 50 
Spain 11.3 59 39 
Sweden 5.3 75 67 
UK 5.2 71 52 
EU 7.5 64 39 
EU Target (2010)   70 50 
USA 6.0 73 58 
Japan 5.2 69 62 
 * April 2002 ** 2001  
 
 
THE LUMP-OF-LABOUR FALLACY 
 
But many people doubt whether more jobs will result if more people look for 
work.  Indeed some people believe that the only way to reduce unemployment is to 
reduce the number of people looking for work – for example through early retirement.  
This is a profound error, and, unless people understand the process of job-creation, 
there is no chance of our hitting Europe’s employment target. 
 
The number of jobs is determined by the amount people want to buy – that is 
by aggregate demand.  Aggregate demand is influenced by many factors, mostly 
outside the direct control of policy makers.  However, monetary policy, in particular, 
is very important and is set so as to try and ensure that inflation remains low and 
stable.  In a recession, aggregate demand is low and this is reflected in higher levels of 
unemployment.  Monetary policy is then generally loosened in order to stimulate 
aggregate demand.  As the economy recovers, at some stage it runs into labour 
shortages and inflationary pressure.  In anticipation of rising inflation, monetary 
policy is then generally tightened.  There is an unemployment problem if, at this 
point, unemployment is still high. 
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The key issue is how much unemployment remains when labour shortages 
become excessive and inflation therefore starts rising.  This level of unemployment 
is known as the NAIRU (non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment).  It is, if 
you like, the sustainable rate of unemployment and, if there is no trend in inflation up 
or down, it will also be the average rate of unemployment over a run of years. 
 
This rate of unemployment differs greatly between countries and over time, 
and depends on the institutions and policies existing at the time.  It is these factors 
which determine the average unemployment rate – in other words they determine how 
many jobs there will be for a given total labour force.  As we have said, at all times 
the number of jobs will depend on aggregate demand.  But, because of the inflation 
constraint, aggregate demand will be restricted by the amount of available labour.  So, 
over a run of years, the number of jobs will ultimately depend on the available supply 
of labour – that is, on the number of those who are ready and willing to take up jobs.  
This proposition is crucial, and many of the mistakes in employment policy come 
from a failure to understand it. 
 
Consider for example policies to encourage early retirement.  If we start at the 
sustainable rate of unemployment and labour supply is then reduced by early 
retirement, unemployment will fall at first.  But then, as labour shortages bite, 
inflation will rise and aggregate demand and employment will be cut back until 
employment is back in line with the now reduced supply of labour.  Alternatively, if 
we encourage more older people to work and labour supply increases, inflation will at 
first tend to fall, permitting a rise in aggregate demand and in the number of jobs.  
This is the direction in which Europe has to move if we are to support an ageing 
population from a reduced flow of births.1 
 
So it is quite wrong to think of the number of jobs as given, independent of the 
supply of labour.  That is the lump-of-labour fallacy.  If you think of the changes in 
employment and labour supply over the centuries it is quite obvious how wrong it is.  
And here is some further evidence from the recent past. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the supply of labour has grown at hugely different rates in 
different countries.  But the number of jobs in each country has grown more or less in 
line with the growth in labour supply. 
 
Countries also differ in their levels of labour force participation.  If the lump-
of-labour theory were true, one might expect those with lower labour force 
participation rates to have lower unemployment.  But, as Figure 2 shows, this is not 
so.  If anything it is the other way round. 
 
One might also expect that countries which had lowered their participation 
rate most would have also lowered their unemployment most.  Again, as Figure 3 
shows, this is not so. 
 
So the starting point is that, if we increase the supply of labour, we will 
increase employment.  This has two implications.  First, we can increase 
employment by increasing labour force participation (for example that of single 
mothers or older people).  We return to this issue shortly.  Second, we can increase 
RL340a  21 October 2002 
 5
employment by increasing the effective supply of labour from people who are already 
unemployed and searching unsuccessfully.   
 
We begin with the unemployment issue, because it is a source of major 
suffering and one of the greatest failings of contemporary European civilisation.2  Our 
analysis is based on the mass of evidence provided by the different experience of 
different countries.3 
 
 
Source: For sources to all figures and tables, see Endnotes. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Labour force participation rate (15-64) and unemployment rate, 2000 (%) 
 
Employment 
Unemployment
Figure 1 
Percentage growth in the labour force and employment 1960-2000 
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Figure 3 
Change in labour force participation rate (15-64) and change in unemployment 
rate. 1990s compared with 1980s (% points) 
 
 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT WHEN VACANCIES ABOUND 
 
The key evidence concerns the relation between unemployment and vacancies.  
When vacancies are high, unemployment should be relatively low – because it is easy 
for unemployed people to find work.  Yet, strikingly, in France, West Germany, 
Belgium and Spain vacancies in recent years have been extremely high by historical 
standards4, despite high unemployment.  It is this high level of vacancies that helped 
to generate increasing European inflation in 2000/1, which led to higher interest rates 
and the end of the European recovery. 
 
The situation is shown in Figure 4.  In all four countries vacancies in 2000/1 
were far higher than in 1975.  One would therefore expect that unemployment would 
have been lower in 1975.  But in fact it was more than double (except in Belgium). 
 
The main upward shift of unemployment relative to vacancies occurred in the 
1980s.  During that period a similar shift occurred in almost every European country.  
As Figure 5 shows, it occurred as well in Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands (see 
Figure 5).  But in those countries something different then occurred in the 1990s.  
Unemployment fell back to close to its level in 1975.  This reflected a structural shift, 
since vacancies did not rise compared with 1990 – if anything the reverse.  So in those 
countries the unemployed became much more effective at filling vacancies, while in 
France, Germany, Belgium and Spain they did not.  Why was this? 
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There is no evidence of any major change in the mismatch between the 
characteristics of the unemployed and the characteristics of the jobs in any of the 
countries we are discussing.5  So the change must have been a change in the matching 
process – in how unemployed people are treated. 
 
 
Figure 4 
High-unemployment countries 
(During the 1990s unemployment at given vacancies rose) 
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* Survey Data: Percentage of firms reporting shortages of labour 
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Figure 5 
Low-unemployment countries 
(During the 1990s unemployment at given vacancies fell) 
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*  CBI Survey: (1/2)*( % firms reporting shortage of skilled labour + % of firms reporting shortage of 
other labour) 
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HOW UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE ARE TREATED 
 
Even in the 1980s it was evident that unemployment differences between 
countries were influenced by how unemployed people were treated.6  It was striking 
that the United States had virtually no long-term unemployed (with a duration of over 
a year), while Europe had almost as many long-term unemployed as short-term 
employed.  The most obvious explanation was the long-duration unemployment 
benefits that existed in Europe but not the U.S.  This relationship is depicted crudely 
in Figure 6, and it exists even when other factors are allowed for.7 
 
 
Figure 6 
Long-term unemployment and the duration of benefits 
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The duration and level of benefits are one set of factors influencing 
unemployment.  But even more important is the help which unemployed people get in 
finding work and the conditions which apply to the receipt of benefit.  These two 
factors, active labour market policy and benefit conditionality, work best in 
conjunction with each other. 
 
 
Benefit conditionality 
 
Clearly, one way to reduce long-term dependence on benefits is to make sure 
that benefits are used for their intended purpose – to support people who are not 
working and who really cannot find work.  In other words, the right to benefits must 
be matched by an obligation to get a job if jobs exist.  There must be a “test of 
willingness to work”. 
 
As a recent OECD conference revealed, countries differ amazingly in the 
framework within which benefits are dispensed.8  Experience shows that unemployed 
people are more available to fill employers’ vacancies if 
 
(i) benefits are paid through the same office as that where people are placed 
in work; 
(ii) unemployed people have to attend regularly in person, and 
(iii) unemployed people are expected after a period to be available for most 
types of work, even if this involves substantial journey times or even (as in 
a few countries) moving home with the help of a subsidy. 
Thus the organisation and effectiveness of the public employment service are crucial 
factors affecting the level of unemployment. 
 
The problem with imposing strict availability conditions is that these are 
difficult to apply unless the employment service is extremely active in helping people 
to get offers of work.  So a “stricter benefit regime” to reduce “passive” dependence 
on benefits only makes sense if linked to an “active” labour market policy to help 
people back into work.  The two should be complementary. 
 
 
Active labour market policy 
 
This is the policy known as “welfare-to-work”.  The phrase comes from 
America, where it mainly applies to lone mothers.  But the practice as applied to 
unemployed people has been mainly developed in Europe.  Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Britain all introduced major welfare-to-work policies in the 1990s - hence the 
changes shown in Figure 5.  And in the last year or two France, Germany and Spain 
have taken more limited steps towards greater conditionality. 
 
In labour market policy there has to be an especial focus on preventing long-
term unemployment, since it is so destructive.9  This means ensuring that everyone 
gets offers of work or training within a year or so of becoming unemployed, as 
required by the E.U. Luxembourg Guidelines.  Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands 
do this for young people, but only Denmark and the Netherlands do it for people of all 
ages.  The aim must if possible be to channel offers of work from regular employers, 
RL340a  21 October 2002 
 12
mainly in the private sector.  But, to prevent long-term dependence on benefits, we 
need to ensure some worthwhile activity for everyone.  It must be actively aimed at 
employability, so that, when we cannot secure a regular job, we should offer 
meaningful work with NGOs or socially-useful projects.  The measure of success is 
the number who get regular work and keep it. 
 
The right to offers of work will only work fully if linked to an obligation 
to accept one of the offers.  Welfare-to-work must involve the principle of mutual 
obligation.  The state has an obligation to ensure that offers of work are channelled to 
every unemployed person within a reasonable time after becoming unemployed.  But 
in return the citizen should take advantage of those offers, and lose some or all of 
their benefit if they do not do so, unless there are medical reasons to the contrary.  
The Luxembourg Guidelines should be extended to include this. 
 
 
Additionality 
 
As always, there is the issue of whether such policies can really expand 
employment.  Many people doubt whether active labour market measures can work 
owing to “displacement” and “substitution”.  In extreme form, these fears derive from 
the ‘lump-of-labour fallacy’: if the number of jobs is fixed and we enable Mr X to get 
one of them, then some other person must by definition go without work. 
 
In the very short-term of course the number of jobs is fixed.  For example an 
employer may have a vacancy which would have gone to Mrs Y but instead the 
employment service induce the employer to take Mr X, who was hard to place.  At 
that instant Mrs Y stays unemployed rather than getting a job.  But by definition Mrs 
Y is inherently employable since she would normally have got the job.  If she does 
not get it, she will look for another one.  Employers will then find that there are more 
employable people in the market - they can more easily fill their vacancies.  This will 
exert downwards pressure on wages, and this will then make possible a higher level of 
employment at the same level of inflationary pressure.  So eventually employment 
will rise. 
 
But by how much?  Evidence on substitution and replacement is by its nature 
difficult to obtain.  In the past it has been mainly got by asking questions to 
employers.  When a subsidy is evaluated, employers are often asked the following: 
 
1. Of the individual subsidised, how many would you have hired anyway? 
(“Deadweight”) 
 
2. Of the remaining jobs subsidised, how many would have been filled by other 
recruits in any case? (“Substitution”) 
 
3. Of those remaining subsidised jobs which represent an increase in your own 
employment, how many were at the expense of your competitors? 
(“Displacement”) 
 
The net job creation resulting from the subsidy is then said to be the total number of 
subsidised jobs minus 1, 2 and 3. 
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Until recently this procedure has been used almost universally, and often 
implies that net job creation is only 20 per cent of the total number of jobs subsidised.  
Yet these estimates of substitution and deadweight are based on a theory of the labour 
market which is never used for any other purpose. 
 
The theory being used is that, if somebody would have been employed in one 
place and that opportunity closes down, then unemployment increases permanently – 
by that amount.  This makes no allowance for the possibility (discussed above) that 
people who find one channel of employment blocked will find another channel.  The 
procedure is especially extraordinary when one considers that typically half the 
people supposedly sent into unemployment by the process of substitution are people 
who already have a job and would have simply been changing jobs. 
 
Only recently have economists began to realise that the old assumptions about 
substitution are invalid.  Lawrence Katz of Harvard University for example, has 
insisted on a more rational analysis of the main U.S. wage subsidy programme for 
youth, the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit.  Until 1988 it covered disadvantaged young 
people aged 18-24, but from then onwards it ceased to apply to people aged 23-24.  
This change provided a good controlled experiment, enabling one to isolate the effects 
which the subsidy had previously had on the employment of 23-24 year olds.  The 
conclusion was the 40-52 per cent of the subsidised jobs had represented net additions 
to employment.10  This shows the crucial importance of analysing active labour 
market policies within their overall setting.11 
 
Interestingly, evaluations of more intensive job search assistance have never 
suffered from the problems discussed above.  And they have generally shown good 
value for money.  These can have the added advantage that extra effort is easily 
focussed on those who really need it.  This is an important element in any active 
labour market policy, and helps to reduce deadweight. 
 
One further point on unemployed people.  Throughout Europe, ethnic 
minorities are a growing proportion of the labour force and their unemployment rates 
are usually much higher than the average.  Ethnic minorities need especial help and 
the same principle applies to them as to all citizens: the principle of rights and 
responsibilities.  They, more than most, need the right to offers of work or training but 
they also have the responsibility to master the language of their adopted country and 
to use the offers that are available to them. 
 
 
OLDER WORKERS 
 
If we move from unemployed people to older workers and mothers, there are 
two issues which these groups share in common.  First, there is the issue of 
distortions.  Those not working may for that reason be receiving state benefits, in 
which case there is a cost to the rest of society and therefore a possibility that 
incentives are inefficiently distorted away from work.  Second, there is the issue, 
arising from increased longevity and decreased birth rates, that we need to increase 
the numbers in work in order to pay for the growing numbers of dependent elderly.  
That said, the reasons for non-participation are very different for older people and for 
single mothers – and so are the policies needed to increase participation. 
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Among older people (55-64) only 42 per cent are in the labour force and only 
38½ per cent are working – making an unemployment rate of 8 per cent, the same as 
the overall rate.  The situation is very similar to what it was ten years earlier, but it is 
highly unsatisfactory.  To find out what is causing it, we can learn a lot from the huge 
differences in participation rates and employment rates across countries (see Table 1) 
and their time series variation.12  There are a number of key explanatory factors.   
 
The first is the standard age of retirement at which state benefits become 
payable.  The second is the use of unemployment benefits as a form of early 
retirement benefit, with none of the usual job-search conditions attached.  And the 
third is the availability of invalidity benefits, often not properly monitored to see 
whether the person still suffers from the problem they had when they first went on to 
benefit.  (Some 15 per cent of all men aged 55-64 are on invalidity benefit in Britain, 
Germany, Italy and 25 per cent in the Netherlands.13)  To achieve higher participation 
of older workers will require changes in all of these practices, and especially in the 
standard age of requirement. 
 
But there must also be wider changes in society’s attitudes and approaches to 
older people.  From 2006 at the latest every European country must now introduce 
laws against age discrimination in employment.  But this will only succeed if at the 
same time older workers become genuinely more attractive to employers through 
progressive updating of skills, either through workplace learning or independent 
study.  Continuous learning and adequate job mobility in middle age are important to 
prevent workers become burned out or bored before their natural working life is over.   
 
One key handicap facing older workers is their low level of ICT skill and this 
must be urgently addressed.14  More flexible pay for older workers could also help, as 
could lower social security payments levied on the employers of older workers. 
 
 
MOTHERS 
 
Among people of working age, mothers are the other main group who are 
often not working.  The number of non-working mothers is falling rapidly, but must 
continue to fall if employment targets are to be met. 
 
For policy purposes it is important to distinguish between those whose choice 
is relatively undistorted (married mothers) and those who may be eligible for state 
benefits.  The single mothers are the more serious problem and we shall focus on 
them especially.15 
 
The first issue is the availability and conditionality of income support from the 
state.  In some countries like Britain support is available without any job-search 
requirement.  In some others job-search is required except when the children are very 
young.  Generally participation is higher where job-search is required.  A second issue 
is the availability of work with suitable hours.  Where part-time work is readily 
available, some mothers who would not otherwise work will choose to do so.  Then 
there is the question of leave.  If a pregnant mother retains her right to return to her 
job, employment rates will be higher.  And finally there is the issue of childcare – the 
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more childcare is available, the more women will work.16  If Europe wishes to achieve 
its employment targets, all these issues will have to be addressed. 
 
 
WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
We have focussed so far on the supply side of the market, which in the long-
run is the ultimate determinant of unemployment and employment rates.  But the 
demand side is also very important.  If wages are held too high, employers will not 
employ the available supply.  There are two issues.  One is the general level of real 
wages.  At a given level of unemployment, these will be pushed too high if either the 
unemployed are not effectively supplying their labour (which we have already 
considered), or if there is autonomous wage push, due for example to union militancy 
or rises in import prices.  Wage push is only likely in the context of unions and has 
been avoided in many of the smaller European countries by coordinated efforts of 
employers and unions (the Netherlands) or sometimes by the unions on their own (as 
at times in Sweden) or by employer solidarity (Portugal). 
 
The second and most serious problem concerns relative wages, across skills or 
regions.  Across skills unemployment rates are much higher for unskilled people.  
One reason for this is a greater rigidity of wages at the bottom end.  However, most 
legal minimum wages in Europe are low enough to cause no problem, and in some 
monopsonistic markets they may even raise employment.  The more serious 
consequences of wage rigidity occur at the regional level, where overly high wages 
are a major cause of unemployment in East Germany, Southern Italy and Southern 
Spain. 
 
Experience in the U.S. and to a degree the U.K. suggests that marked 
differences in unemployment rates across regions can be reduced whenever two re-
equilibrating factors are at work.17  The first is wage adjustment.  If unemployment is 
higher in one region than another, wages in the high-unemployment region decline 
vis-à-vis wages in the low-unemployment region.  This attracts investment, which 
leads to more jobs in areas of high unemployment.  The second re-equilibrating factor 
is regional labour mobility: there is net migration away from the high-unemployment 
regions. 
 
In Continental Europe, these two re-equilibrating factors are often not allowed 
to operate properly.  Centralised wage-setting institutions deter the emergence of 
significant regional wage differentials.  At the same time, a number of factors – 
including state transfers to the high-unemployment areas – reduce the pressure to 
migrate.  Thus, large regional labour market imbalances – the North-South divide in 
Italy and Spain or the West-East divide in Germany – are a prominent feature of the 
European landscape.  Persistently high unemployment in some regions is also 
associated with low participation rates and a deterioration of the environment in 
which firms have to operate.  In high-unemployment regions the public sector tends to 
pay more than the private sector (at least in terms of entry wages) and provides more 
job security.  If it is difficult to get a public sector job when already employed in the 
private sector, this encourages “wait-unemployment” where people (sometimes the 
most educated people) queue for public sector jobs to become vacant.   
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In order to move these regions away from the high-unemployment low-
participation equilibria in which they are trapped, it is therefore necessary to act on 
both the demand and the supply side.  On the demand side, it is necessary to pursue 
greater decentralisation in collective bargaining; wages should be allowed to vary 
across regions so as to reflect more closely the differences in labour productivity and 
the cost of living.  Decentralisation in pay determination should extend to the public 
administration, and be accompanied by the introduction of incentives for higher 
productivity and hiring procedures which discourage queuing.   
 
On the supply side, the task is to bring welfare-to-work principles into the cash 
transfers provided to non-employed individuals in these regions.  A key requirement 
for this is to have unemployment benefits, rather than other instruments (like early 
retirement and invalidity pensions) which merely encourage non-participation in the 
labour market rather than supporting job search.  Welfare-to-work should encourage 
regional labour mobility, but should circulate information on jobs available in more 
buoyant labour markets and sometimes also subsidise moving costs.  Regional 
mobility should not necessarily involve long-range migration, as there are often areas 
within the high-unemployment regions that are more dynamic. 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY 
 
Finally there is the thorny issue of employment protection.  In public rhetoric 
it is common to attribute “high European unemployment” to high employment 
protection.  But in fact employment protection is especially high in some European 
countries (like Portugal, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands) where unemployment 
is well below the U.S. level.  The bulk of the economic evidence suggests that 
employment protection raises long-term unemployment (by reducing hiring), reduces 
short-term employment (by reducing firing), and has no clear effect on total 
employment.18  But specific policies to prevent the closure of enterprises are 
inefficient.19 
 
The main danger of employment protection is that it strengthens the hand of 
workers in wage bargaining, leading to excessive wage pressure even when 
unemployment is high.  Any effort to reduce employment protection should have this 
issue firmly in view.  Unfortunately the famous Spanish labour market reform of 1984 
did not.20  It introduced temporary employment contracts, while actually increasing 
the security of the insiders who were already employed.  As a result there was no 
reduction in wage pressure.  All efforts aimed at creating a dual labour market are 
likely to fail in exactly the same way as the original Spanish reform. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: FLEXIBILITY IS NOT ENOUGH 
 
Our conclusion is that for unemployment what really matters is 
• how unemployed people are treated, and 
• regional wage flexibility. 
For the employment of older workers what matters is 
• reduced subsidies to inactivity, used if necessary to finance 
employment subsidies 
RL340a  21 October 2002 
 17
• lifelong learning 
• an older official retirement age,  where appropriate, and 
• anti-discrimination legislation. 
And for single mothers we need 
• reduced subsidies to inactivity 
• more child-care help, and 
• more opportunities to work part-time. 
Can these principles be useful summarised as “more labour market 
flexibility”?  Surely not.  In many cases what is needed is more activism and even 
sometimes more regulation.  So can we please stop pretending that “more flexibility” 
is the answer to all our problems. 
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2. THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 
 
 
During the last decade the sustainable rate of unemployment in Britain has 
been reduced from around 8½ per cent to around 5 per cent.  The simplest way to 
demonstrate this is shown in Table 2.  In 1989 labour shortages were intense and 
inflation rising, even though unemployment was nearly 7½ per cent.  By contrast, in 
2001 labour shortages were less than average, inflation stable and unemployment only 
5 per cent. 
 
The explanation of these changes lies mainly in changes in how unemployed 
people are treated.  But it also reflects the increased wage flexibility following the 
trade union reforms of the Thatcher period. 
 
 
HOW UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE ARE TREATED 
 
We can divide the history of how unemployed people are treated into three 
phases.  In the first phase, lasting until 1986, there was a progressive relaxation of the 
“willingness to work” as a condition for getting unemployment benefits.  In the mid 
1970s the payment of benefit and the placing of unemployed people, which had 
previously been done in one office, was split into two separate offices making any 
work test more difficult to apply.  And from 1982-86 benefit recipients did not even 
have to register for work.  In addition signing on at the benefit office, which had been 
weekly, became fortnightly.  It is not surprising that the sustainable rate of 
unemployment rose. 
 
But from 1986 onwards the work test began to be used again and the system 
tightened.  In 1986 six-monthly work-focussed interviews (called Restart Interviews) 
began, and since 1990 benefit recipients have been formally expected to be “actively 
seeking work”.  From 1990 onwards the benefit office and job centres were 
progressively reunited, and in 1996 the Job Seekers Allowance was introduced which 
allowed a personal adviser to issue directions to the job seeker. 
 
Then in 1997 the Labour government came to power, with a strong 
commitment to spend more money on helping the unemployed, but linking this to 
stricter obligations laid on the unemployed person.  The central concept was the New 
Deal, under which unemployed people can no longer continue to live indefinitely on 
benefit.  Instead they must be fully active after some period (6 months for people 
under 25, and 18 months for others).  To understand how the New Deal works, one 
must begin with the overall framework for handling the unemployed. 
 
 
Table 2 
Britain: a comparison of two “peak” years 
 
 Unemployment rate Labour shortage index Change in 
wage inflation 
1989 
2001 
7.3 
5.1 
Highest ever since 1973 
Much lower 
+1% 
0 
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Unemployment Benefit System 
 
Most unemployed people in Britain receive Job Seeker’s Allowance.  The 
level of benefit is unrelated to previous earnings, but it is higher if the person has a 
dependent spouse or children.  It is means-tested, so that an unemployed person can 
gain very little extra income from small amounts of work.  The level of cash benefit is 
quite low, but a half of all unemployed people also get their housing costs paid for in 
full. 
 
Even so, for some people with large families the replacement ratio is quite 
high: 5 per cent of people in work would keep 70 per cent of their net income if they 
became unemployed.  To improve things, the government has “made work pay” 
better, by increasing the benefits paid to people who are in work but on low incomes, 
through a revamped and more generous system of Tax Credits.  This has been a major 
part of government policy, which is aimed both at reducing poverty and encouraging 
work. 
 
But more important for encouraging work are the conditions applying to 
receipt of Job Seeker’s Allowance. 
 
(i) The person must sign on at the job centre once a fortnight (on a specific day and 
time).  He will have conversations of around 5 minutes with an adviser, who is 
meant to draw his attention to suitable vacancies. 
(ii) Longer interviews lasting around an hour are held every six months.  The 
person must have an “action plan” and can be subject to specific direction by 
the adviser – for example to attend a course. 
(iii) For up to 13 weeks a person need look only for jobs like the one he lost.  But 
after that he is in principle expected to consider any job in any occupation, 
provided it involves less than 1 hour’s travel each way.  In practice these 
obligations are still not fully applied. 
(iv) If individuals do not satisfy the above requirements, or become unemployed by 
quitting their previous job without just cause or being sacked for misconduct, 
they get no Job Seeker’s Allowance for up to 6 months, unless they qualify for 
hardship payments. 
(v) Formally Job Seekers Allowance can be drawn without any time limit, but in 
practice the New Deal (discussed below) imposes a limit of roughly 10 months 
for people under 25 and 21 months for people over 25. 
 
It is the job of the employment service to monitor whether people satisfy the 
criteria for receiving benefit.  If there is evidence to the contrary, the matter goes to an 
adjudicator.  Table 3 shows how many people have their benefit cut.  Sanctions may 
last for between a few days and six months.  In addition those in the last three rows of 
the table lose their Housing Benefit, but not the others.  (The numbers in Table 3 can 
be compared with some 3 million people who enter unemployment during the year 
and with nearly 1 million unemployed benefit recipients at a point in time). 
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Table 3 
Number whose benefits were cut during the year: by reason for cut in benefits (2001/2) 
 
Quit last job without good cause 
Lost last job through misconduct 
 
77,000 
16,000 
Refused work without good cause 
Refused to attend course/programme 
Failed to attend interview 
 
39,000 
20,000 
112,000 
Not now available for work 
Not actively seeking work 
10,000 
11,000 
 
 
Public employment service 
 
The agency responsible for all this is a new agency called Jobcentre Plus.  It is 
responsible both for helping people find work (the old Employment Service) and for 
paying benefits to people of working age (the old Benefits Agency).  In a single 
jobcentre building it helps not only people on Job Seekers Allowance but also lone 
parents on Income Support and people on disability benefits.  The last two groups are 
not required to seek work, but everyone applying for any of these benefits must now 
start with a work-focussed interview. 
 
Jobcentre Plus works through 1,000 job centres, and employs some 85,000 
staff (full-time equivalents), who include those who calculate and pay benefits.  It 
currently services about 950,000 unemployed benefit recipients at any one time.  It 
has about 2.5 million vacancies referred to it each year – about ⅓ of the total 
vacancies created in the country.  It fills about 1.1 million of these vacancies itself, 
mainly with unemployed people, thus placing about a third of all the people who 
become unemployed each year.  Clearly with more resources it could place more 
unemployed people more rapidly.  It has a computerised system of vacancies, but with 
the existing IT facilities it is not yet possible to print off a list of suitable vacancies for 
every unemployed person each time they sign on.  This would be highly desirable.  It 
also provides information on vacancies through touch-screen computers, which job 
seekers can use at job centres, printing off relevant details. 
 
There are no limits on the rights of private sector companies to set up as job-
brokers in competition with Jobcentre Plus.  For, though the market for job-matching 
is imperfect and therefore needs public intervention, this provides no argument for 
limiting entry. 
 
To do its work most effectively, Jobcentre Plus must be able to help people 
become more employable.  Many people are so disadvantaged that they need to be 
referred to courses in job-search methods, or to job clubs which assist job-search, or 
to vocational training.  It has long been the job of the employment service to do this, 
and it has always had some funds to buy these services. 
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New Deal 
 
But since Labour came to power a quite new line of thought has been added in 
– that people ought not to remain unemployed beyond a certain time limit.  It is very 
bad for anyone to continue unemployed for a long time.  If they are desperate to work, 
it is deeply depressing.  Or, if they are working the system (for example “working 
while drawing benefit”, as a number do), it is an abuse of tax-payers’ money.  On top 
of this, long-term unemployment stigmatises a worker and makes it increasingly 
difficult for him to find work. 
 
So there should be a point at which it becomes impossible for a person to 
remain at home drawing benefit.  Instead people ought after a period to be guaranteed 
activity and to receive their income through activity rather than inactivity.  Activity 
should be a mandatory condition for income.  This is the idea behind the New Deal. 
 
Since 1998 there has been a New Deal for Young People, and since 2001 a 
comparable New Deal for people over 25.  Each New Deal has a “gateway” lasting up 
to 3-4 months, during which intensive efforts are made to place the person in regular 
work or on suitable New Deal programmes.  Once placed a person must be active for 
at least 6 months (young people) or 3 months (adults) before they can again be 
inactive recipients of benefits.   
 
For young people the possible forms of activity are 
• a subsidised job with a regular employer (secured by a 6-month subsidy of £60 a 
week 
• work experience in the voluntary sector (while receiving benefit plus £15 a week) 
• work experience in an environmental project (ditto) 
• full-time vocational education (while receiving benefit) 
All the options include training for at least a day a week.  For adults the options are 
less structured and are focussed on leading as soon as possible to a regular job. 
 
The Youth New Deal has been a clear success.  Despite the obligations it has 
put on young people, it has been very popular.  It has virtually eliminated long-term 
unemployment among young people, but has not (as was feared) led to any increase in 
short-term unemployment (due to increased churning).  It has been subject to a 
number of independent evaluations, which all come to broadly similar conclusions.21  
The programme is judged to cut youth unemployment by at least 35,000.  It costs 
about £350 million a year in gross terms but is estimated to cost under £150 million 
net, after allowing for savings in unemployment benefits and extra taxes.  So the net 
cost to the Exchequer per extra person in work is about £4,000 per annum.  On the 
test of net benefit to society it passes with flying colours. 
 
The adult New Deal has only existed for a year in its present form, so it is too 
early to offer definitive evidence.  But the results appear to be as good as for the 
Youth New Deal.  The same is true of the less tightly focussed arrangements provided 
through the private sector in so-called Employment Zones. 
 
Many of Britain’s unemployed are virtually illiterate and innumerate.  About a 
third cannot read the instructions on a medicine bottle or calculate the change they 
should receive after a simple purchase at a shop.  Plans are being prepared for 
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compulsory screening and training of unemployed people with basic skills problems.  
It is important that this screening happens as early as possible so that no unnecessary 
time is wasted. 
 
 
SINGLE MOTHERS AND OLDER WORKERS 
 
Britain has a remarkably large number of working-age households in which no 
one is working – one of the highest rates in Europe.  This is a major cause of poverty 
– both among children and among older people.  One third of Britain’s children live in 
families with under half the average income per head.  Many of them are one-parent 
families, where the mother does not work – Britain is almost the only E.U. country 
where single mothers are less likely to work than women in general.22  But in all 
families where no one is working it is highly desirable to increase employment. 
 
The government has two main methods to promote this.  One is to ‘make work 
pay’.  The government has greatly enhanced and rationalised income support for 
workers who are low paid, as well as introducing a National Minimum Wage. 
 
But equally important effects on employment are likely to follow from the 
second strand of current reform, which is to alter the conditions for entitlement to 
benefits.  At present 850,000 single parents are living on Income Support, and some 
1.7 million working-age people are living on long-term disability benefits and not 
working.  (Half of these are over 50.)  Many single parents stay on Income Support 
for long periods (60 per cent for over 2 years).  And once somebody goes on disability 
benefits they rarely come off before they reach pension age, even if their health 
condition improves enough for them to do many kinds of work. 
 
Neither of these groups is currently required to seek any kind of work.  But for 
both groups the government has introduced compulsory work-focussed interviews 
when they first apply for benefit and at specified intervals thereafter.  There is no 
compulsion to work, so far at least, but there is compulsion to attend the interview.  In 
addition there is an evolving New Deal for Lone Parents in which a much wider range 
of help is provided, and a comparable New Deal for Disabled People. 
 
We do not yet know what the effects of all this will be.  But it is an area of 
major potential change.  Since information about jobs and the payment of benefits are 
now linked in a quite new way through the new unified Jobcentre Plus, we now have 
a system which over the medium term is highly likely to increase participation and to 
reduce unemployment. 
 
 
WAGE FLEXIBILITY 
 
As we mentioned in section 1, the greatest problem with wage rigidity is its 
impact on regional (and sub-regional) unemployment.  This has historically been a 
major problem in Britain.  In the 1989 boom the level of unemployment in the North 
remained high, while that in the South fell sharply (see last two rows of Table 4).  
However, during the 1990s most of the gross regional inequalities have disappeared, 
RL340a  21 October 2002 
 23
leaving high unemployment blackspots within every region but low-unemployment 
areas in every region also.23 
 
So what has changed?  As Table 4 shows, there has been a dramatic reversal in 
the drain of jobs out of the North.  This change in employers’ behaviour results in part 
from the lowering of wages in the North relative to those in the South.  As Figure 7 
shows, relative wages have responded to differences in unemployment rates.  
Moreover, this responsiveness has risen over time, reflecting the diminished power of 
national trade unions caused by a series of legal changes in the 1980s and by a smaller 
membership. 
 
As the drain of jobs ceased, migration from North to South fell.  But some 
migration continued in response to differences in wages and job opportunities.  It was 
the combination of more jobs and fewer people that cut the relative unemployment 
rate in the North. 
 
Table 4 
Britain's North-South divide, and how it was reduced 
  1979 1989 2000 
     
Unemployment Rate     
 North  5.1 7.7 6.3 
 South 3.1 3.8 4.6 
      
Employment     
North as % of South 129.1 115.3 117.1 
Labour Force     
North as % of South 131.8 120.1 118.5 
Wages     
North as % of South 91.3 80.4 81.9 
Note: In this analysis, South=South-East, South-West and East Anglia;North=rest of Britain 
 
 Figure 7 
Unemployment rates and the change in male wages : (1974-1997) 
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Figure 7 
Unemployment rates and the change in male wages: 
Britain 1974-1997
RL340a  21 October 2002 
 24
EMPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY 
 
Employment protection has never been as strong in Britain as on the 
Continent.  Between 1965 and 1975 the government introduced successively 
minimum levels of severance pay, protection against unfair dismissal, and minimum 
periods of notice for redundancy.  These laws applied from 1975 onwards to workers 
who had been in the employer’s service for over 1 year.  However in the 1980s the 
Conservative government weakened the laws by confining them to people employed 
for over 2 years.  But in the 1990s Labour again reverted to the 1-year cut-off. 
 
This issue has not been a major source of controversy in Britain.  For most 
Britons the main issues about government policy concern benefits and the conditions 
attaching to them.  In particular people ask why unemployment is still so high 
compared with the 1960s, even though vacancies often exist within travelling distance 
of the unemployed. 
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3.  THE DANISH EXPERIENCE 
 
 
During the last decade unemployment has declined from 10.6 per cent (1993) 
of the labour force to 4.2 per cent (2001)24.  At the same time employment has 
increased by about 6.5 per cent of the labour force and the number of full time 
persons taking part in training and other active policy measures has been reduced 
from 6.6 per cent per cent in 1996 to 4.5 per cent in 2001.  OECD (2001) estimates 
the costs of the active labour market policy in Denmark to be 1.6 per cent of GDP, 
which is among the highest in the OECD-countries. 
The explanation of these changes lies in changed labour market policies, 
changed macroeconomic conditions, changed wage expectations and changes in the 
bargaining system.  Below, we will focus on the role of labour market policies and the 
changes in that. 
 
 
HOW UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE ARE TREATED 
 
Since unemployment became a problem in the Danish economic policy in the 
mid-1970s, various policies have been tried to weaken the adverse effects on 
individuals and society.  For a long time, the main emphasis was to prevent direct loss 
of income, to maintain the ability to work and to prevent psychological problems for 
those hit by severe unemployment.  Therefore, most labour market policies had 
income maintenance as the main focus.  Some of these policies have had the clear 
objective of diminishing the labour force.  For long, the main policy instrument was to 
prolong the maximum period of unemployment benefit so that as few as possible 
would exhaust their benefits.  That policy was given up with the reforms in 1994 and 
later.  However, the backbone of the unemployment system is still the UI-benefit.  
 
 
UI-benefits 
 
In Denmark, unemployment insurance is organized on a voluntary basis as in 
Finland, Sweden and Belgium, with a common offspring in the guild system and the 
German UI-funds.25  There are 35 unemployment insurance funds, and most of them 
are informally linked to one or two Trade Unions.  Legally, there is no connection, but 
in reality memberships of a union and the UI-fund are solicited by union 
representatives as one package.  In order to get UI-benefits, an employee must have 
been a member for more than 1 year, unless he has graduated from an 
education/vocational training lasting more than 1.5 years, and he has worked for more 
than 52 weeks within the last 3 years.  Furthermore, he has to be registered at the 
Employment Service and has to be available for work.  Members of the UI-system get 
their benefit through the UI-fund, while counselling and activation are administrated 
by a system of state-run employment offices.  The membership fee (tax deductible) is 
equal to maximum benefits for 6 days plus some costs (about €500 in 2001). 
Expenditure of the UI-fund in excess of this revenue is paid by the state.  This indirect 
subsidy is probably the reason why 78 per cent of the workforce is a member of the 
UI-system. 
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The benefit is 90 per cent of the previous hourly wage up to a maximum of € 
406 per week, which is € 10.99 per hour in 2002.  This means that people earning less 
than € 12.21 per hour have a replacement ratio of 90 per cent and people earning more 
have a lower replacement ratio.  The reference wage is calculated as the mean wage 
over the last 3 months.  If the unemployment in one week is less than a full 
workweek, i.e. below 37 hours, benefits are reduced to 82 per cent of the normal 
benefits on an hourly basis.  The same rule applies to eligible members who come 
directly from education.  Benefits are taxable like most other income support in 
Denmark.  
For non-members losing their jobs, there is a similar welfare payment, though 
it is means-tested on the basis of the household income and wealth.  The welfare 
benefit is part of the social welfare programs, which also run a separate activation 
system for those who are able to work. 
 
 
Active labour market policies 26   
 
Until 1994, active labour market policies consisted of a job offer and a training 
programme, an educational subsidy system, AMU courses and a programme for 
subsidies to newly-started self-employed people.  The job offer scheme offered 7 or 9 
months’ jobs to long-term unemployed with a total unemployment duration of more 
than 2 years.  These jobs counted against eligibility to another period on 
unemployment benefit.  The maximum duration of benefits was at that time 9 years. 
Participants in these schemes were paid the normal unemployment benefit.  The 
scheme to promote self-employment paid half of max UI-benefits for a 3-year-period.  
Finally, there were AMU courses, where unemployed and employed could get 
training in specific skills, for example in  operating specific equipment.  
 
After the “Labour Market Reform of 1994” and subsequent changes, 
unemployed members of an unemployment insurance fund have the right and the 
responsibility to take part in some type of activation program after 12 months of 
unemployment measured over a 24-month-period.27  The first period of 12 months is 
without other obligations than looking for a job.  The activation period can then last 
for up to 3 years.  In this period, the unemployed person has to be active more than 75 
per cent of the time.  The unemployed person will receive unemployment benefit 
throughout the 4 years, though the wage under job training may be higher according 
to the type of job. 
 
As a result of the 1994 reform, none of the subsidized job-training periods 
under the labour market programmes count against eligibility to further 
unemployment benefits.  However, this did not lead to more people exhausting their 
benefits than before the change.  The reason is probably that the labour exchange 
offices use a lot of effort to provide jobs to this group.  Another exit possibility is 
health-related retirement.  This issue has not been dealt with in any investigation so 
far. 
 
The main activation measures are job training and education.  The purpose is 
to give the unemployed an opportunity to get back into work through a job-training 
period with a private or public employer.  A private employer receives a fixed subsidy 
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of about half a normal low salary for a 6-month-period and has to pay a wage usual 
for that particular job, whereas the public sector pays a fixed, relatively low wage.  
The ratio between private and public job training has been around 1 to 4 before and 
after the reform.  Furthermore, individual job training can be arranged for people who 
have difficulties getting a job because of long-term unemployment or poor 
educational background.  In addition, activation can occur in so-called pool jobs in the 
public sector.  
 
Education is another type of activation.  Education can be taken at ordinary 
educational institutions or as courses designed for the unemployed.  Ordinary 
educational courses have to be on a list issued by the Ministry of Employment.  
Unemployed people enrolled in education can obtain unemployment benefits for a 
period of up to 5 years.  Ordinary educational courses with benefits have become very 
popular in recent years, so 4 out of 5 in the education programme choose ordinary 
educational courses.  
 
The other big programme providing education was the leave scheme for 
education.  This was in effect from 1992 to the end of 2000.  The leave scheme for 
education gave paid leave from a job on condition of the consent of the employer.  
Even unemployed people could get leave for education and would not be bothered 
with job offers.  Benefits were full UI-benefits and educations should be picked from 
a list.  The number and variety of educations started out with few constraints, but 
became more and more limited over time until it was abandoned by the end of 2000.  
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that a few other programmes were introduced, 
which never really caught big numbers: job rotation and the home service scheme.  
Job rotation introduced in 1992 gave support to education and training schemes for 
employed people, provided an unemployed person was employed as substitute.  The 
improved business cycles probably worked like a severe tranquilliser on this 
programme.  The home service scheme is an arrangement where certified firms can 
get state subsidies to employ people to do household services.  This subsidy makes 
firms able to compete with black market activities. 
 
A special youth programme was introduced in 1996, which covered young 
people below 25.  The initial period on normal UI-benefit lasts only 6 months.28  After 
that, the youth has the right and the responsibility to take education of at least 18 
months duration, if he/she has no prior vocational training.  If the unemployed person 
has a vocational qualification, the compulsion is to take job training.  For both groups 
benefit is 50 per cent of the UI-benefit.  Non-compliance means a complete stop for 
all benefits.  
 
This program has clearly had an impact on the unemployment of youth.29  But 
the relatively high growth rate in the economy has also had a positive impact on the 
demand for youth.  The other programs have also been evaluated.  The general 
impression is that the subsidized job training schemes in the private sector have a 
positive impact because they create a match.  If the person does not stay with the 
employer after the training period, the effect is rather dubious.  Similarly for the 
public sector jobs.  It is also hard to find a clear positive effect of the educational 
programs.  At face value some of the programs look beneficial, but when taking the 
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relatively long duration of the program where people do no search into account, most 
programs look less favourable.  
 
 
Incentive problems 
 
The purpose of the high replacement ratio is to prevent a possible loss in 
welfare, if the person becomes unemployed.  However this creates, an incentive 
problem because the high replacement ratio makes the income from finding a job little 
different from the income as unemployed.  If the unemployed person is eligible to 
other transfer payments, the problem is aggravated.  It has been demonstrated that in 
Denmark 23 per cent of all employed women and 12 per cent of all employed men 
earn less than € 67 extra per month by working compared to receiving benefits.30  
Similar incentive problems exist in many other countries but they are probably more 
serious in Denmark because benefits for low-wage earners are so high (90 per cent) 
and benefits are not reduced over time as in most other countries.  Furthermore, 
income tax is high meaning that extra income earned is taxed by a minimum tax of 43 
per cent.  Similarly, on the employers’ side there is only a small incentive to limit the 
use of unemployment as a means to adjust to temporary business downturns and to 
seasonal fluctuations in labour demand.  An employer-paid first day for each 
unemployment spell was introduced in 1988.  This was later extended to two days.31  
 
The effect is not only that a number of people choose to leave work with 
benefits if they can, but also that the labour supply by low-wage groups is limited.  
Thus, it has been shown that the average number of hours worked during a year by 
men in the lowest decile of the wage distribution is less than 2/3 of a full working 
year.  The main source of finance for this is the UI-system32 and even with low 
overall unemployment in 2001 20 per cent of the employed have received 
unemployment benefit.  At the peak of unemployment, this percentage was 32 per 
cent. 
 
Incentive problems are even more serious for those who are not insured and 
receive welfare payment but are able to work.  Since welfare benefits are means-
tested, labour income is taxed at 100 per cent up to the maximum income for 
eligibility of welfare benefits.  For couples where both are unemployed this means 
that one spouse must actually receive a relatively high income if their total income is 
to exceed the welfare payment.  The incentive problems are especially serious for 
workers with low skills, low wage and high replacement ratios and for those with high 
opportunity costs of working.  The groups most affected are accordingly immigrants 
families where both spouses are on welfare, low skilled workers and, especially, lone 
mothers.  
 
A reform in 2002 has lowered the maximum welfare pay in order to reduce the 
problem of welfare recipients.  Furthermore, the special youth package has been 
extended to cover the age group 25-30, with some special concerns for low-income 
families.  
 
Earlier, single mothers received means-tested child support.  The implicit tax 
rate for the low-wage single mothers was as a consequence very high, and the 
resulting labour participation rate was accordingly low.  Child benefit was therefore 
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changed into a lump-sum benefit for most mothers, and it was clearly seen that the 
labour force participation rate increased.33 
 
Finally, Table 5 summarizes the treatment of the unemployed according to the 
rules prevailing in 2002.  The 25-year age limit is going to be lifted to 30 years 
according to a new political agreement.  
 
 
Table 5 
Summary of treatment of the unemployed 
 
Age 
criteria UI 
Duration 
of UI 
before 
activation Activation UI-level 
Duration 
of 
activation After activation 
< 25 
years 
Max, 
90% 6 months Educ, if no previous 50% of UI 3.5 years Means-tested welfare pay 
   Else, jobtraining 50% of UI 3.5 years Means-tested welfare pay 
> 25 
years 
Max, 
90% 12 months Educ, jobtraining UI or wage 3 years Means-tested welfare pay 
 
 
Similarly, we have summarized a description of the roles of different 
authorities and sanctions in Table 6. Sanctions for quitting a job are not used very 
often, probably because employers have no or little economic incentive to 
discriminate between quits and lay-offs.  The other offences lead to shorter 
suspensions of UI-benefits.  Again, relatively few offences lead to suspensions. 
 
 
Table 6 
Roles of authorities, and sanctions 
 
Authoritie
s 
Labour Exchange office (AF)  
- State 
Responsible for job offers for all, activation, 
individual plans for activation, checking of job 
readiness for members of UI-funds. Calculation of 
UI based on wage for previous 13 weeks. 
 UI fund – quasi-private 
 
Payment of UI, check of job readiness for members 
 
Municipal Social Welfare offices Partly responsible for activation, job readiness for 
non-members 
Sanctions Quitting a job, with exceptions No UI for 5 weeks 
 Repetitive quitting  No UI, eligibility after ordinary job 
 Reject an offered job No UI for 1 week 
 
Quitting an offered job within 
one week No UI for 1 week 
 Below 25, all cases No UI, eligibility after ordinary job 
 
 
 
OLDER WORKERS AND LEAVE SCHEMES 
 
For workers leaving work the main forms of support are for post-employment 
wage (efterløn), transition pay (overgangsydelse), childcare leave, and sabbatical 
leave.  The most important of these is the post-employment wage introduced in 1979.  
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Here, insured members of the UI-funds, who are between 60 and 67 of age, can obtain 
early retirement.  In the first year 48,000 persons went into this programme. After the 
start, more and more of each age cohort above 60 have taken the post-employment 
wage, with the result that in 2001 158,000 persons or 5.5 per cent of the labour force 
were on the scheme.  From the age of 62, more than 50 per cent of the formerly 
working cohorts are now on the post-employment wage.  
 
In 1999 the programme was supplemented by a substantial premium if 
participation in the post-employment pay program was postponed until after the age 
of 62.  At the same time the required membership duration was extended.  These 
changes in the rules have not stopped the reduction of the retirement age.  The reason 
is undoubtedly that the benefit paid by the state to those leaving early is so big that 
when it is added to the alternative value of time, the extra premium for continuing 
work does not materially alter the economic incentive to work. 
 
Transition pay was an offer to unemployed between 50 and 60.  The offer was 
that they could get 82 per cent of the highest UI-benefit if they left the labour force 
for good.  This programme was in effect from 1992 to 1995 and was chosen by about 
44,000 persons.   
 
The leave scheme programme, introduced in 1992 and reinforced in 1994, 
made it possible to take childcare leave.  The leave period is 8 to 52 weeks.  All 
parents with children below the age of 9 are eligible for childcare leave.  Unemployed 
people and welfare recipients are also eligible.  The benefit is 60 per cent of the 
highest UI-pay. To a large extent, childcare leave is used to extend maternity leave 
and it has been used to reduce the pressure on many municipal day care programmes.  
Finally, the sabbatical leave programme should be mentioned.  It was in effect from 
1994 to 1999 and made it possible to take leave for purely sabbatical reasons.  The 
rules were similar to the other programmes with two exceptions: the employer must 
give his consent and he should employ a long-term unemployed person as a substitute. 
The rationale behind the leave schemes was undoubtedly to create temporary 
job openings for the unemployed, making it possible for the unemployed to get a 
foothold in the labour market. But the programme was not limited to the employed.  
Indeed a large fraction of the leave takers were unemployed.  In other words the 
unemployed got an alternative to searching for a job.  Thus, the introduction of the 
new schemes can be interpreted as a rise in the reservation wage for the unemployed 
and for those who are considering taking leave from a job.  Furthermore, the 
introduction of the programmes coincided with a growing demand for labour.  As a 
result, a real shortage was created in some professions (nurses for example), where 
the loss for the individual due to the lower replacement ratio (the UI pay divided by 
the alternative wage) was limited.  Finally, the de facto extension of maternity leave 
was considered by some to be harmful to the careers of women.  
 
The leave programs have now been stopped because they lack political 
support. 
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WAGE FLEXIBILITY 
 
Until 1987 wage bargaining in Denmark was characterised as central, though 
there was also decentralized wage bargaining.  The system was characterised by fixed 
wage scales where experience in the trade, or age and education, were important 
parameters.  However, wages have always been allowed to differ in level between 
firms.  The first step towards decentralizing the wage bargaining was taken in 1987.  
Bargaining was shifted down to industry and firm level and the system was 
characterised as coordinated wage bargaining within strict guidelines.34  These 
guidelines were finally abandoned in 1993 and wages were then fully negotiated at 
firm level.  This has started a process whereby more and more wages are 
individualized and more and more employees negotiate their wages directly with their 
employer.  Table 7 shows that the centrally-bargained contracts have been replaced 
first by decentralized bargaining and later to some extent by contracts where there is 
not even a wage rate.  This means that firms will have to negotiate the wage with the 
employee without any constraints.  This allows for the use of modern performance-
related pay at all levels in private firms. 
 
 
Table 7  
The development in bargaining, 1989-2000, private sector.  Percentage. 
 
 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 2000
Central Bargaining 34 19 16 16 16 15
Wage is in principle negotiated 
between employer and employee 62 77 80 73 67 65
No wage rate in workplace contract 4 4 4 11 17 20
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
 
The decentralization of wage setting is probably important for the explanation 
of the growth of the Danish employment in the 1990s, which took place without the 
usual sharp increase in all wages and prices following a period with increasing 
demand and falling unemployment.  Firm-level wage setting makes it possible for 
firms to reward workers for higher productivity without creating inflation. 
 
A similar development has not yet occurred in the public sector.  Here, wages 
are to a great extent still largely determined at the central bi-annual bargaining.  But 
even here local possibilities for giving individual allowances on top of the wage 
scales have been created.  The new wage system called “New-wage” has many fewer 
steps on the ladder than used to be the case.  It is the intention that more of earnings 
should be paid as personal allowances, depending on qualifications, job functions and 
individual productivity. 
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EMPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY 
 
Denmark has one of the lowest levels of employment protection in Europe.  In 
most cases, blue-collar workers can be laid off at very short notice.  This has been 
widely accepted among unions and legislators because it creates a flexible labour 
market that allows for the most efficient use of labour.  For the trade unions, the 
compensating arrangement is undoubtedly the high UI-benefit.  One of the immediate 
costs of lowering employment protection is undoubtedly higher turnover.  Danish 
turnover is as high as 30 per cent on average.  It is somewhat higher among young 
people, but the general result is that all ages and occupational groups more or less 
equally share the “burden”.  
 
By contrast in countries with stricter employment protection those without 
tenure tend to carry the burden of turnover, and this creates the usual insider-outsider 
problems.  In several E.U. countries the unemployment rate of youth is more than 20 
per cent while it is about 3 per cent for Danish youth.  Of course, there are other 
reasons for this, the most important being the Danish apprentice system.  But one may 
conclude that higher employment flexibility (and higher turnover) in Denmark does 
not lead to higher unemployment. 
 
 
WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE DANISH EXPERIENCE? 
 
The major changes in the labour market policies after 1994 were a gradual 
reduction of the maximum length on UI, and earlier activation.  These elements 
clearly reduced the reservation wage for the unemployed and therefore reduced 
unemployment.  At the same time a number of leave schemes were introduced for 
employed and unemployed people and a supplementary early retirement scheme 
allowed unemployed people in the age group 50-60 years to retire early.  These 
policies had the reverse effect on reservation wages and unemployment.  More 
recently, these latter policies have all been abandoned.   
 
The youth program, which combines early activation and lower benefits (after 
6 months of unemployment) seems to have had an effect.  The lack of economic 
incentives to take work (except for young people) means that many resources are 
spent on counseling, control, and activation.  The better employment and lower 
unemployment is of course associated with the relatively high economic growth and 
relatively low wage increases in Denmark since the beginning of the 1990s.35  
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4 THE DUTCH EXPERIENCE36 
 
 
Nowadays the Netherlands is one of the countries with the lowest 
unemployment rate.  In 2001 registered unemployment amounted to only two per cent 
of the labour force, which is probably below the equilibrium level of unemployment.  
Many firms have considerable problems in filling their vacancies.   
 
It has not always been like that.  In the second half of the 1970 and the first 
half of the 1980s unemployment in the Netherlands grew to levels unprecedented in 
the post-war period and higher than in most other European countries.  In 1983 the 
unemployment rate reached its highest level of 12 per cent.  In that period both the 
participation rate and the employment rate were much lower than in most other 
Western European countries.  In 1983 the participation rate (16-64), for example, was 
only 59 per cent, compared to a E.U. average of almost 66 percent.  By 2000, 
however, the Dutch figure had grown to 75 per cent, while the E.U. average was only 
slightly higher than in 1983 (70 per cent).37  A similar pattern can be observed with 
respect to the participation rate. Admittedly, a considerable part of the new jobs are 
part-time jobs.  Furthermore, a substantial number of people have disability benefit, 
but some of them could also be labelled as unemployed.  However, even if we take 
account of these points, the labour market performance of The Netherlands is 
impressive compared to most other countries. 
 
Why did the labour market situation in the Netherlands improve to such an 
extent while other countries such as France, Germany and Italy still experience high 
unemployment rates?  Given the fact that all these countries face more or less similar 
external circumstances, internal factors must be responsible for the relatively good 
performance of the Netherlands.   
 
In this chapter we focus on labour market policy in the Netherlands and the 
extent to which it may have contributed to the favourable situation on the Dutch 
labour market.  What has changed in Dutch labour market policy since the 1980s?  
What makes Dutch policies different from those in the other E.U. countries? 
 
 
HOW UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE ARE TREATED 
 
Active labour market policy 
 
What makes Dutch active labour market policy (ALMP) different from that in 
(most) other countries?  The following points seem to be most important: 
• the radical change of the institutional structure; 
• the high level of ALMP expenditure and the emphasis on subsidized labour; 
• the emphasis on prevention in active policies. 
 
 
Institutional aspects 
 
Logically we have to begin with the changes in institutional structure, 
although these are not the main reasons for the success of the policy.  In the early 
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1990s the Netherlands still had the traditional structure in which the Public 
Employment Service (PES) was a part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment and was mainly responsible for implementing active labour market 
policy.  It held, for example, a monopoly in job brokerage.  By the end of the century 
the system had been transformed into a market-driven system in which 
implementation is largely outsourced to private companies.  During the 
transformation process a tripartite system was attempted and finally abandoned. 
 
It is unlikely that these institutional changes have increased the effectiveness 
of ALMP.  The change to a tripartite system in the early 1990s, which was 
accompanied by decentralization of the PES and abolishment of the state monopoly in 
job brokerage, was evaluated in 199538.  No evidence was found for a positive effect, 
neither on the output of the PES, nor on labour market performance.  The reason why 
the abolition of the state monopoly in job brokerage did not have an effect was that, 
despite this monopoly, de facto many private temporary work agencies (TWAs) were 
already highly active in job placement.  Often employers used temporary work as a 
hiring and selection device for new workers.  
 
After the 1995 evaluation several changes in the institutional structure of 
AMLP took place, which gradually transferred the responsibility for ALMP from the 
PES to the bodies dealing with unemployment benefits.  The UWV is responsible for 
social security benefits, including unemployment insurance benefits.  Unemployed 
persons who are not entitled to an unemployment insurance benefit may apply for a 
social assistance benefit, which is paid by the municipality.  Nowadays funding for 
ALMP is almost completely done by the UWV and the municipalities.  The latter 
organizations must outsource implementation of placement and training activities 
largely to private organizations using auctions or beauty contests.  The part of the 
former PES dealing with such activities has been privatized and is now one of 
competitors in this market. Employment offices still exist, but became part of new 
local organizations, the Centers for Work and Income.  Their main tasks are collecting 
and diffusing labour market information; profiling clients; and referring the latter to 
UWV or municipalities for a benefit and, for clients at high risk of long-term 
unemployment, for special help (job counseling, training or placement in a subsidized 
job).  The CWIs offer no specific services to employers. 
 
The new system is clearly suffering from teething troubles.39  The responsible 
bodies (UWV and municipalities) are still learning to deal with tender procedures. 
However, there are some points of concern: 
- There is little we know about the effectiveness of the measures.  Evidently, 
evaluation is more complex when a large number of institutions are 
involved. 
- There is a strong focus on short-term placement results leading to 
underutilization of the training instrument. 
- The incentives for the benefit-paying organizations to reduce the number 
of beneficiaries are insufficient.  
 
In attempting to improve the performance of ALMP too much emphasis has been put 
on the institutional framework.  What was and is still missing is a thorough analysis of 
market failure, effectiveness of various measures and policy priorities. 
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Expenditure and types of measures 
 
Up to the early 1990s ALMP expenditure as a percentage of GDP amounted to 
approximately one percent.  Then it gradually increased to some 1.6 percent, which is 
higher than in most other E.U. countries.  However, during most of the period under 
consideration, the figure was not higher than the E.U. average and often below it.40  
 
What seems to be different in the Netherlands is the emphasis on subsidized 
labour.  In 2000 two-thirds of the available resources was spent on sheltered 
employment for the disabled and on subsidized jobs for the long-term unemployed.  
The increase in ALMP expenditure between 1990 and 2000 is largely due to higher 
expenditure on subsidized jobs.  Therefore, we are inclined to conclude that as far as 
ALMP has contributed to the improved labour market performance, the effect can 
largely be attributed to the increased use of job-creation schemes for the long-term 
unemployed.  Evaluation studies indicate that the percentage of the participants that 
would have remained unemployed is much higher for this type of measure than for 
most other measures.  It is also clear that most of the subsidized labour is useful to 
society and would not exist without the subsidies (although in many cases the work 
has previously existed and has disappeared owing to budget cuts). 
 
 
Forerunner in preventive policies 
 
Already in the second half of the 1980s the Netherlands started to move from 
an essentially reactive approach to ALMP to a more proactive one.  During the early 
1990s a law was introduced obliging the government to do two things: 
- to reinforce its efforts to place young jobless people in regular jobs or find 
them a position as an apprentice; 
- to offer a subsidized job to those unable to find a regular job or training 
position, preferably not later than six months after entering unemployment, 
but certainly not later than one year. 
 
This contributed to solving the youth unemployment problem.  Later on, the same 
approach was introduced for the other age groups among the unemployed.  This 
became known as the ‘full-coverage approach’ (‘sluitende aanpak’ in Dutch).  
Nowadays, this approach forms one of the corner stones in the guidelines for the 
European Employment Strategy. 
 
 
Benefits 
 
In the Dutch situation benefits have had a distorting effect on the labour 
market.  It became clear that, for those depending on low-paid jobs, accepting a job 
hardly increased their income as social benefits are related to net minimum wages.  
Furthermore, most municipalities had special arrangements for minimum income 
families (such as free access to certain services).  Owing to these arrangements people 
could in some cases even experience a reduction in net family income when accepting 
a job, which may lead to prolonged unemployment (the so-called unemployment 
trap).  More generally, high replacement rates increased the use of social security and 
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social assistance and reduced the outflow from it, resulting in a high incidence of 
long-term unemployment.  Until 1998 the share of the long-term unemployed in total 
unemployment was almost 50 per cent.  Then, it dropped rapidly.  
 
Several measures have been taken to reduce the inflow of new benefit 
recipients and to increase the transition from beneficiaries to a paid job.  First, the 
entitlement criteria for an unemployment insurance benefit have been stiffened.  
Furthermore, benefit duration has been made dependent on work history.  These 
changes have led to a lower inflow into unemployment and a shorter average 
unemployment duration.  
 
In the Netherlands benefits are connected to the net minimum wage.  As a 
percentage of the average wage the latter has decreased significantly over the years 
(see below), implying that benefits have also considerably lagged behind average 
wages.  There is evidence that this development has contributed to the reduction in 
unemployment.41  However, the connection with the minimum wage implied that the 
unemployment trap was hardly reduced for people depending on the low-wage 
segment of jobs.  In the second half of the 1990s a situation emerged in which many 
beneficiaries could find a job, but not all wished to accept one.  So far the government 
has been reluctant to further lower benefits.  The tendency has been to reinforce 
penalties and to introduce bonuses rather than to further reduce benefit levels.   
 
A number of studies have shown that the threat of losing (part of) one’s 
benefit in case of inactive job search behaviour and reluctance to accept jobs is 
already an effective tool to stimulate the transition to work.42  Furthermore, the 
incentive for unemployed people to accept a job was increased.  First, people in work 
received tax reductions.  In 2001 specific bonuses for the long-term unemployed 
taking work were also introduced on a national scale.  Before the introduction of this 
national scheme individual municipalities applied their own specific bonus schemes.  
An evaluation study suggests that the effects of these municipal schemes have been 
small.43  
 
So far, we have dealt with unemployment benefits.  However, the pressure 
was not only increased on workers and benefit recipients, but also on employers.  The 
reform of the Disability Act (see the next section) is particularly important in this 
respect.  Furthermore, unemployment insurance is only partly financed on the basis of 
a collective system on the national level.  The other part is financed collectively at the 
level of the industry.  Therefore, premiums differ between industries.  During the 
period under consideration, the component that differs between industries has been 
increased twice. 
 
 
EARLY RETIREMENT AND OTHER POLICIES FOR EMPLOYED PEOPLE 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s early retirement was still seen as an important 
way to increase the job chances of young people in a situation of high unemployment.  
The government stimulated early retirement both in official and unofficial ways.  The 
official way was creating fiscal incentives.  Unofficial ways were: 
- allowing people to use the disability scheme (WAO) in case of skills 
obsolescence; 
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- allowing employers to fire older workers first, during an economic 
downturn; 
- exempting older unemployed people from the duty to look for a job. 
Using the disability scheme was both attractive for employers and older workers.  For 
employers it was an easy way to get rid of workers with relatively high costs and low 
productivity.  As disability benefits were relatively high, it was also attractive for 
workers.  Not surprisingly, the participation rate of older workers fell considerably.  
 
The increasing financial burden of the disability act (WAO) induced the 
government to limit access to this scheme.  Several changes in the disability act were 
carried through, reducing the incentive for both the worker and the employer to use 
the scheme.  It is no longer possible for older workers to obtain a disability benefit 
when the transition to inactivity is essentially caused by economic reasons.  
Furthermore, the level of disability benefits has been cut considerably.  Finally, a 
system of experience rating was introduced making the premiums for the employer 
dependent on the number of his workers that have enrolled in disability in the past.  
 
There is a similar tendency to reduce the attractiveness of early retirement 
schemes, which are determined by the social partners at the sectoral level.  The fiscal 
advantages of early retirement have been reduced somewhat and a further reduction is 
planned.  Finally, it is no longer possible for firms to give priority to firing older 
workers. 
 
Not only lowering the inflow into disability, but also increasing the outflow 
from it, reduces the use of the disability schemes.  Specific measures have been 
developed to stimulate the outflow by making use of instruments such as training and 
placement.  In a recent evaluation positive net effects on job entry rates are found for 
these measures.44  
 
Burnout and disability at older age can to some extent be reduced by 
increasing job mobility, training, and opportunities for temporary withdrawal from the 
labour market during one’s career.  The concept of “transitional labour markets” 
stresses the importance of more diverse patterns in work, training, and time for care 
activities over the life cycle.45  Slowly, some institutional changes in this direction 
have been made.  Possibilities for temporary leave are somewhat enlarged and plans 
have been developed for the introduction of a so-called life cycle insurance for 
individual employees to save time for leave and training in the future.  However, the 
Netherlands is not the forerunner in this field:  international statistics show, that 
regarding participation in continuous training, for example, the Netherlands holds an 
average position among the E.U.-countries. 
 
To what extent did the measures taken improve the employment rate among 
the people aged over 55-64?  Between 1995 and 2000 it increased from 30 to 38 per 
cent and is now almost at the European average.46  This points to some success.  
However, the increasing employment rate in this age category reflects partly the 
general increase in participation and employment for women (see the next section).  
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LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION 
 
The labour market participation of the category aged over 50 was discussed in the 
previous section.  In this section we deal with two other groups: women and ethnic 
minorities.  
 
 
Women 
 
The Netherlands clearly differ from other E.U. countries in the sense that: 
- the labour market participation rate among women was historically very 
low; 
- this rate has increased rapidly since the early 1970s and is now higher than 
in most other E.U. countries; 
- most women work part-time. 
Some believe that the increasing labour market participation of women caused the 
wage moderation, which was a key factor behind the successful performance of the 
Dutch labour market (see below). 
 
Both cultural and economic factors may explain the increasing participation of 
women.  However, both government policies as well as the collective bargaining 
system have most likely contributed to this development.  The key to the success was 
the upgrading of part-time labour.  In many countries part-time labour is associated 
with temporary work and relatively poor working conditions and low pay.  In the 
Netherlands most part-time workers have a permanent contract and do similar work to 
full-timers.  There is still a gap between full-time and part-time work, but it is not so 
wide.  The government laid the legal foundation for the relatively secure position of 
part-time workers.  Furthermore, as one of the main employers in the Netherlands, the 
government set an example by allowing its workers to work part-time.  
 
Activation is also one of the ways along which the government has promoted 
female labour market participation.  Women returnees to the labour market benefited 
from active policies such as training.  Capacity in child care has been increased, and 
parents receive a government subsidy when they buy child care services, although 
there is still a big unfilled need.  Indirectly, the government has contributed to the 
increased labour market participation of women by its liberal attitude to TWAs.  
Many women found a job through the mediation of TWAs in the period when job 
brokerage by private agencies was not formally allowed.  Finally, unemployed single 
parents (in practice mostly women) on social assistance benefit are now obliged to 
look for a job when their children are five years or older. 
 
It is clear, however, that we are still far away from equality between men and 
women.  Women spend more time on non-market activities, work less hours, are paid 
less for the same work, and hardly have access to jobs in higher management. 
 
 
Ethnic minorities 
 
The ethnic minority population has grown steadily since the mid-1960s.  There 
is a big variety of ethnic groups.  With the exception of some groups such as the 
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people originating from Surinam (a former Dutch colony), ethnic minorities tend to 
have an extremely weak position in the labour market. Labour market participation 
and employment rates are very low and unemployment rates are very high.  The 
relatively low skill level of most ethnic minorities compared to the autochthonous 
population is an important factor causing this situation.  However, discrimination also 
plays a role.  And finally differences in culture and language add to the problem. 
 
The government has tried to improve the labour market situation of ethnic 
minorities in several ways such as: 
- by making ethnic minorities a target group in active labour market policy; 
- by taking measures in initial education to reduce drop-out among students 
from ethnic origin; 
- by stimulating industries to make collective agreements containing 
arrangements concerning the inflow of workers from foreign origin; 
- by introducing a law forcing companies to publish information about the 
representation of ethnic minorities among their staff; 
- by making arrangements with the 100 largest firms concerning the ethnic 
component in their human resource policies; 
- by introducing courses for newcomers, including language courses and 
courses in Dutch culture and institutions. 
However, so far the effectiveness of these measures has been limited.  In 1999 the 
employment rate among ethnic minorities was only 45 per cent compared to 66 per 
cent among the autochthonous population.  Compared to 1994 the relative position of 
the former had hardly improved. 
 
 
WAGE FLEXIBILITY 
 
A striking difference between the Netherlands and the other E.U. countries is 
that in the former wage increases have been significantly lower from the early 1980s 
onwards.  During the period 1979-1989 unit labour costs fell by 0.6 per cent per year, 
compared to an increase of 5.8 per cent for the E.U. as a whole.  For the period 1988-
1998 the figures are 1.3 and 2.7 per cent, respectively.  Only in recent years was this 
situation reversed.  The moderate wage development over such a long period is 
probably one of the major explanations for the spectacular increase in employment.  
 
Why did the moderate wage development happen?  The specific Dutch 
institutions are an important factor.  The Netherlands has a corporatist structure of 
wage formation in which collective agreements are made at the industry level.  
However, there is also a centralist element of co-ordination.  Unions and employers’ 
organizations are part of national federations.  These federations together with the 
government define the average wage increase that is thought to be desirable from a 
macroeconomic point of view. In this process the federations, of course, consult their 
members.  Economic projections made by CPB, an independent government policy 
research institute, also play a role in this process.  In specific industries unions and 
employer’s organizations deviate from the targets defined at the national level 
depending on the specific situation in their sector.  In practice the deviation from the 
targets at the central level appears to be relatively small. 
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Another aspect of collective bargaining in the Netherlands is that the 
government can make the agreements binding for all employers and workers in the 
industry involved.  Thus, the agreements also hold for employers and workers that are 
not members of an employers’ organization or a union involved in the bargaining 
process.  Legally, the government also has the possibility to intervene in wage setting. 
 
In 1982 the economic situation had deteriorated to such an extent, that the 
social partners agreed to moderate wage increases for a considerable period of time, 
as long as it took to improve the situation substantially.  This is the so-called 
Wassenaar agreement.  However, it is fair to say that the threat of government 
intervention in wage setting also played a role.  Without the agreement between the 
social partners the government would almost certainly have intervened. 
 
The Wassenaar agreement included more than wage moderation.  In return for 
the unions’ acceptance of moderate wage increases, the government and the 
employers agreed to shorten labour hours, although reluctantly.  In the Dutch case the 
reduction in hours was mainly achieved by increasing opportunities for part-time 
work, causing a substantial increase in the labour supply of women and thereby in 
total labour supply. Without the continued growth in the level of labour supply it 
would have been difficult to prolong the wage moderation. 
 
Another explanation for the moderate wage development and the small wage 
differentials between industries in the Netherlands is given by Teulings.47  He argues 
that while Dutch unions do the contract negotiations on behalf of all the workers in an 
industry, only a minority of the workers (on average 28 per cent) are union members.  
Thus, unions do not have sufficient power for an antagonistic strategy.  There is 
always the threat that employers will switch to negotiations at company level.  
Although occasionally it has been proposed to have the workers’ councils negotiate 
wages at the company level, there has not been much support among employers for 
the idea.  The collective bargaining structure has also proved useful in creating 
arrangements in fields such as training (including the apprenticeship system and the 
inflow of disadvantaged groups). 
 
So far, we have dealt with wage developments in general.  However, not only 
were generally high wages a problem.  The so-called productivity trap was also a 
major problem.  Wages for low-productivity people were simply too high to make it 
profitable for employers to hire them.  The government took several measures to deal 
with this problem: 
1) The level of the statutory minimum wage relative to the average wage level 
was reduced.  It dropped from 65 per cent in 1996 to somewhat less than 50 
per cent in 1997. Already in the 1970s youth minimum wages were severely 
lowered.  
2) The government used its power to refuse to make collective agreements 
generally binding unless the social partners on the industry level were willing 
to introduce lower wage scales approaching the statutory minimum wage 
level.  
3) It introduced the so-called SPAK, which implied a general reduction in social 
premiums paid by employers for workers earning the statutory minimum wage 
or a wage just above that level.  This was in fact a general wage-subsidy for 
low-paid labour.  
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EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY 
 
The share in total labour hours of what is often called ‘flexible labour’ 
(temporary contract, homeworkers, etc.) has hardly changed since the mid-1980s.  
The full-time worker with a permanent contract is still the dominant type of worker.  
Furthermore, most part-time workers have a permanent contract.  Neither can we 
observe a rising trend in job mobility.  There has been a lot of talk about the new self-
employed worker.  Inspired by the high expectations of the new economy, some 
people envisaged a labour market in which workers would no longer have permanent 
or even semi-permanent labour contracts, but would sell labour hours to different 
employers.  However, on the macro scale such self-employed workers form only a 
tiny minority of the total workforce.  In some industries, though, such as road 
transport, it is a significant phenomenon.  
 
According to the new ‘Flex law’ employers can renew a temporary contract 
twice, so long as the total length of the contract is less than three years.  When the 
contract is renewed for the third time or the total contract period is more than three 
years, the contract becomes permanent by law.  In the past a temporary contract could 
only be renewed once.  However, in practice there is hardly any change, as companies 
could find other ways to avoid permanent contracts.  One might even argue that the 
new law reduced flexibility as it limits the options for TWAs.  There is no reason to 
believe that separation costs in the Netherlands are lower than in most other E.U.-
countries. 
 
What is different compared to most other European countries is the liberal 
attitude towards commercial temporary work agencies that dates back to the 1970s.  
Particularly women returnees and school leavers find their way on the labour market 
by starting as agency workers.  Therefore, temporary work has played an important 
role in increasing the participation of women.  It also offered flexibility to employers 
to deal with short-term fluctuations in the demand for labour. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE DUTCH EXPERIENCE 
 
After a period of high unemployment during the late 1970s and the 1980s, the 
Dutch labour market went through a process of remarkable recovery.  From one of the 
worst performers in terms of labour market outcomes the Netherlands turned into one 
of the countries with the most favourable labour market situation.  In trying to find the 
causes for this development, we have looked for factors that have changed 
considerably through time and in which the Netherlands differs markedly from other 
countries. 
 
The first three factors are: the comparatively low wage increases, the increase 
in the level of labour supply and the growing popularity of part-time work.  These 
factors are closely connected to each other.  The increase in labour supply is to a 
considerable degree due to the growing labour market participation of women.  Most 
newcomers took a part-time job.  It would not have been possible to keep moderate 
wage increases for such a long time without a continued growth in labour supply.  
Some argue that the underlying factors are completely autonomous.  However, we 
think that institutional factors did play an important role.  The typical Dutch wage 
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bargaining system, that combines both centralist and decentralized features, has, in 
our view, made a difference.  Furthermore, the government has facilitated the growth 
of part-time labour in several ways. 
 
Next come government policies towards labour costs.  Unemployment rates 
are much higher than average among the low-skilled. Therefore, several wage-related 
policies have been launched to create additional employment for this category of 
workers.  The most important ones are: lowering the relative level of statutory 
minimum wages and a general wage-subsidy on low-paid labour through the social 
security system.  
 
Another important factor explaining the favourable labour market 
development in the Netherlands is the reform of social security and social assistance. 
Benefits have been made less attractive both in terms of level and duration.  
Furthermore, entitlement criteria have become stricter.  And finally, sanctions for 
inactive jobsearch behaviour and abuse have been reinforced.  However, more 
pressure was put not only on (potential) beneficiaries, but also on employers.  
 
Active labour market policy may have contributed to increasing employment 
and diminishing unemployment, but we do not see the institutional reform as a major 
factor.  During the last decade the institutions dealing with ALMP have changed 
almost permanently, not always for the best.  Making a completely privatized system 
of ALMP implementation work, as the Dutch are currently trying to do, requires so 
many arrangements that the costs of such a system seem to outweigh the benefits.  
Involvement of private providers, and the use of tender procedures to choose between 
them, is certainly worth-wile considering, but one public organization (the Public 
Employment Service) should stay in charge of ALMP implementation. 
 
On two points ALMP has made a significant contribution to the improved 
labour market situation. First, the increased use of subsidized jobs for the long-term 
unemployed has made a difference.  Many of these people would have remained 
jobless otherwise.  The current plans to cut the budget for subsidized jobs do not seem 
wise, particularly in a period of rising unemployment.  The second point is that 
ALMP helped facilitate training and job placement of women returnees to the labour 
market. 
 
Increasing the labour market participation and employment rates of older 
workers and ethnic minorities is the most important policy issue for the coming years.  
Partly, the problems of older workers date back to the structure of their working 
career (lack of mobility and opportunities to learn; work pressure that has been too 
high too long).  Solving these problems requires a different work pattern in which 
people have more opportunities to switch between work and non-market activities 
(training, care-taking and leisure) during their working life.  Then, most people would 
be able to remain active longer.  Policies are gradually evolving in that direction and 
the employment rate of older workers is slowly rising again.  Unfortunately, there is 
less reason for optimism regarding the labour market participation of ethnic 
minorities.  So far, policies in this field have not been very successful.  There is 
general agreement that employment rates among ethnic minorities should be much 
higher than they are.  However, and this is a marked difference compared to the early 
1980s at the time of the Wassenaar agreement, there is disagreement about the 
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approach to follow.  An antagonist atmosphere rather than a cooperative mood 
surrounds this problem.  Perhaps other countries could offer examples of good 
practice in these fields to the Dutch. 
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5 RECOMMENDATIONS TO E.U. HEADS OF 
GOVERNMENT 
 
 
The current unemployment rates in much of Europe are intolerable.  In 
popular discussion many factors are blamed, and this leads to lack of focus in the 
effort to reduce unemployment.  The Luxembourg Guidelines agreed in 1997 include 
17 items.  This is too many.  We believe that the best results can be achieved by 
concentrating heavily on the two main factors which explain the very different 
unemployment rates in our different member countries: the treatment of unemployed 
people, and the flexibility of wages. 
 
 
THE TREATMENT OF UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE 
 
It should not be possible for a person to continue in unemployment year after 
year, living on benefit.  Instead there should be a system of mutual obligation.  The 
state should have the duty to secure offers of work or training for everybody within 
one year of becoming unemployed.  And in return the individual should have the 
obligation to take advantage of these offers. 
 
The Luxembourg Guidelines enshrined the first of these: the duty of the state 
to the unemployed citizen.  To this duty should now be added the duty of the citizen 
to take advantage of these offers.  People have a right to be helped and they need 
active assistance with job search throughout their period of unemployment.  But they 
should clearly take advantage of any offers that result. 
 
The majority of E.U. countries have not yet implemented the first two 
Luxembourg guidelines, and it is imperative that they do so.  But it is also vital that 
people who receive offers and repeatedly reject them should lose some or all of their 
benefits, except where there are medical or health-related reasons.  Otherwise we shall 
continue to see high unemployment, even when there are enough vacancies to push up 
wage inflation, thus aborting economic recovery.   
 
This is a difficult political issue but it is crucial.  Countries which have 
grasped this nettle have greatly reduced their unemployment, and the shocking 
unemployment which still remains in Europe cannot be much reduced unless this now 
happens throughout the E.U. 
 
 
WAGE FLEXIBILITY 
 
The other key requirement is greater flexibility of wages, especially as 
between regions.  Much of Europe’s unemployment is concentrated in regions like 
Southern Italy, Southern Spain and Eastern Germany, while at the same time there is 
nearly full employment in other parts of the same country – Lombardy, Catalonia or 
Bavaria.  This is a clear sign that relative labour costs are too high in the high 
unemployment regions.  It would be fiscally impossible to rectify all of these 
imbalances by wage subsidies.  So there have to be mechanisms which allow wages to 
RL340a  21 October 2002 
 45
grow less fast in the high unemployment regions.  In most cases the mechanism will 
involve a greater decentralisation of wage-setting.  And needless to say, wage 
moderation is needed throughout the economy. 
 
 
EARLY RETIREMENT 
 
Finally there is the crucial question of early retirement.  Many Europeans have 
believed wrongly that, if more people retired early, this would reduce unemployment.  
This was based on the fallacious belief that the amount of work to be done is fixed: 
the so-called “lump-of-labour fallacy”.  In fact early retirement has imposed a heavy 
financial burden on companies and governments, and removed the sense of purpose in 
life from very many citizens.  It has made it increasingly difficult for many older 
people to compete in the job market. 
 
This whole approach needs to be totally reversed.  Individuals and employers 
should be encouraged to think in terms of a longer working life.  Individuals should 
continually upgrade their skills and vary their work in order to avoid burnout.  And 
they should be retrained where necessary, with a view to working to at least 65.  
Retirement ages should where appropriate be increased.  All fiscal subsidies to early 
retirement should be phased out, and companies forced to disclose their own costs of 
early retirement.   
 
On the demand side, discrimination against older workers needs to be tackled 
strongly, as required in the E.U. directive.  And, where appropriate, social security 
taxes on employers of older workers could be reduced.   
 
Reversing the tide of early retirement is a major element in the Lisbon agenda, 
with the target of raising the average employment rate in Europe at age 55-64 to at 
least 50 per cent in 2010, from its present 38 per cent.  This will be a major challenge 
requiring action in every country, even where employment is already high.  It can 
only be achieved by vigorous and focussed action. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Full employment is not an unattainable dream.  We can eliminate long-term 
unemployment and ensure that all who want work can find it within a reasonable 
time.  But this requires a clear focus on the three main issues which will make a 
difference: the treatment of the unemployed, the flexibility of wages, and the 
treatement of older workers. 
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Sources of figures and tables 
 
 
Figure 1: 
 OECD Labour Force Statistics, 1958-1978, pages 18 and 24 
 OECD Labour Force Statistics, 1979-1999, pages 11-13 
 European Economy, 73, 2001, pages 274, 275 
 
Figure 2: 
 OECD Employment Outlook, July 2002, pages 208, 209 
 
Figure 3: 
 OECD Employment Outlook, various issues 
 
Figure 4: 
 OECD Employment Outlook, various issues 
 European Economy 73, 2001, pages 274, 275 
 France  – Labour shortage index 
  Definition: Proportion of manufacturing companies that face  
  difficulties in hiring 
  Source: Survey data provided by INSEE, France 
 West Germany – Registered vacancies 
Definition: Data refer to vacancies for jobs of 7 days’ duration or 
more reported by employers to employment agencies to be filled 
within 3 months and remaining unfilled at the end of the month. 
 Source: Federal Institute of Labour, Germany 
Note: From 1991 onwards, vacancies data include also East 
Germany, but given the small number of vacancies in East Germany 
we believe that this is not going to be a problem in our analysis. 
 Belgium – Registered vacancies 
Definition: Data refer to vacancies notified to the ONEM remaining 
unfilled at the end of the month.  They include vacancies within the 
framework of “special temporary work” (Cadre special temporaire), 
youth apprenticeships and special vacancies (Troisiéme circuit du 
travail) 
Source: Statistical Office of Belgium 
Spain  – Registered vacancies 
 Definition: Data refer to pending or effective job vacancies 
 notified to the National Institute for Employment (INEM) and 
 which remain unfilled at the end of the month. 
 Source: National Institute for Employment 
 
Figure 5: 
OECD Employment Outlook, various issues 
European Economy 73, 2001, pages 274, 275 
Britain  – Labour Shortage Index 
 Definition: ½ (% firms reporting shortage of skilled labour + %  
 firms reporting shortage of other labour) 
 Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
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Netherlands – Vacancies 
Definition: Data refer to those vacancies for which someone is required 
within a short time 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
Denmark – Vacancies reported to public employment offices 
Definition: Number of vacancies at the end of the month which have 
remained vacant for more than one week 
Source: Data were kindly provided by the Danish Ministry of Labour 
 
Figure 6: 
Benefit duration is from Nickell and Layard in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, 
Handbook of Labor Economics Vol.3C, 1999 and it relates to 1992.  LTU data 
relate to 1989-98 and are based on tables at the end of OECD Employment 
Trends. 
 
 
Table 1: 
HM Treasury Pocket Databank, 31st July 2002, pages 28,29 based on OECD 
and Eurostat 
OECD Employment Outlook, July 2002, pages 304-309 
 
Table 2: 
OECD Economic Outlook, various issues 
CBI Industrial Survey Index 
Average earnings index 
 
Table 3: 
UK Department of Work and Pensions 
 
Table 4: 
UK Regional Trends, various issues 
 
Table 5: 
www.danmark.dk 
 
Table 6: 
 www.danmark.dk 
 
Table 7: 
 Employers Federation, DA, Arbejdsmarkedsrapport, 2001. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
1 On this and other aspects of labour market strategy required in Europe see Westergaard-Nielsen 
(2000). 
2 As Clark and Oswald (1994) show, unemployment causes similar distress to divorce and 
bereavement.  Other forms on non-employment have no such effect. 
3 See for example Nickell and Layard (1999) which analyses the cross-sectional evidence, and Nickell 
et al. (2001) which analyses the time-series.  Both analyses reach similar conclusions.  On cross-
sectional evidence concerning benefit conditionality see Danish Ministry of Finance (1999). 
4 Different systems of measurement make it impossible to compare vacancy rates across countries.  But 
they can be compared within countries over time.  (No vacancy data are available for Italy.) 
5 Mismatch can be mainly by skill or by region.  In Britain there was some reduction in regional 
mismatch but this was not the main factor reducing overall unemployment. 
6 See Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). 
7 See note 1. 
8 OECD, Labour Market Policies and the Public Employment Service, 2001. 
9 See for example de Koning (2001a) on the importance of preventing entry to long-term 
unemployment.  It may also be desirable to have some automatic intervention for people who spend 
much of their time unemployed through a series of short spells of unemployment. 
10 Katz (1997). 
11 On this wider issue see also de Koning (2001b). 
12 See Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998). 
13 Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998, Table IV.1). 1990 data. 
14 See Gelderblom and de Koning (2002). 
15 See OECD, Employment Outlook, 2001, Chapter 4. 
16 The employer will take the extra cost of this out of the wage-bill. 
17 Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) Chapter 6.  For the U.S., Blanchard and Katz (1992) stress the 
greater importance of mobility than of wage adjustment. 
18 See Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1994). 
19 See Frederiksen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2000). 
20 See Blanchard and Jimeno (1995). 
21 White and Riley (2002), Layard (2000), Van Reenen (2002). 
22 Chapter 5 in E.U. Joint Report for the Commission and the Council, “Increasing labour-force 
participation and promoting active ageing”. 
23 There remain substantial, and even growing, disparities in in-activity rates across regions. 
24 Standardized unemployment rates according to OECD, Employment Outlook.  
25 See Neumann et al., (1991). 
26  Rules and amounts refer to 2002, if not otherwise stated. Source: www.danmark.dk. 
27 The new rules were only gradually implemented.  Thus, the actual unemployment period prior to 
activation was gradually reduced from two years to one year beginning in 1999. 
28 This programme started without any introductory period. 
29  See Jensen, Rosholm and Svarer (2003). 
30  See Smith (1998) and Pedersen and Smith (2002). 
31  See Jensen and Westergaard-Nielsen (1990). 
32 See Andersen et al., (2001). 
33 See Smith, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen (1996). 
34 See Andersen et al., (2001). 
35 See Westergaard-Nielsen (2002). 
36 This chapter is based on a paper which gives a more detailed description of the policies (De Koning, 
2002). 
37 OECD Employment Outlook. 
38 Dercksen and De Koning (1995). 
39 Dykstra and De Koning, forthcoming. 
40 It is also important to note that the evaluation literature points to a rather small net impact of ALMP 
on employment and unemployment. See for example Heckman et al., (1999) and De Koning (2002). 
41 Broersma et al., (2000). 
42 Van de Berg et al., (1998). 
43 Engelen et al. (1999). 
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44 Heyma and De Vos (2002). 
45 Schmid (1998). 
46 OECD Employment Outlook. 
47 Teulings (1997). 
